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Are Feminism and Competition Compatible? 
(earlier draft of paper accepted by Hypatia) 
Amanda Cawston 
 
Contemporary feminist interest in the persistent underrepresentation of women in 
top professions suggests an implicit approval of the competition required to 
achieve these posts. Competition, however, seems to be in tension with feminist 
opposition to domination and oppression. This paper outlines the dimensions of 
this tension and examines three attempts to resolve the incompatibility. The first 
two try to separate the undesirable elements of competition from the positive by 
way of the competitiveness/competition and the challenge/scarcity distinctions. I 
argue that these distinctions fail to alleviate worries about competition, 
particularly in the context of the professions. Meanwhile the third reconciliatory 
attempt offers a pragmatic argument for compatibilism based on the value of 
women’s participation in the professions (and their associated competitions). 
While this pragmatic argument has some merit, I argue it significantly 
overestimates the amount of competition acceptable for feminist participation. The 
end result is that, within the context of the professions, competition remains 
fundamentally in tension with feminism. 
 
 
Competition became a topic of interest in feminist philosophical literature in the 
1980s and early 1990s, as many of the powerful and highly valued positions and 
professions once closed to women (for example, business, politics, academia, and law) 
began to open up. These high-powered and prestigious professions seemed to offer 
both the measure of, and the tools for, ending patriarchy; that is, female achievement 
in these fields would both itself represent success for feminism and give women the 
insider opportunity to reform the very institutions that enforce patriarchy. Yet success 
in these professions required competition, which didn’t sit well with some feminists.1 
Competition seemed antithetical to important feminist aims, including for example, 
the promotion of solidarity, the abolition of hierarchy and domination, and the 
rejection of particular masculine norms that promote and support oppression. But 
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competition also promised to motivate exceptional performance and achievements, 
build self-worth, and of course, offered the means by which to advance the status of 
women (via the greater representation of women in prestigious positions). Women in 
academia (and other professions) were personally confronted with this tension as they 
pursued their own careers and strove to advance those of other women, and prompted 
explicit debate on the (in)compatibility of feminism and competition. The force of this 
tension has since faded though, and today’s feminists have largely lost interest in the 
debate. There is good reason however, in my view, to revisit it. There has been 
significant amount of work recently in uncovering the mechanisms behind women’s 
persistently low representation in prestigious and powerful professions, including in 
the upper ranks of academic philosophy. This includes revealing the workings of 
implicit bias and stereotype threat, and advancing feminist critiques of professional 
philosophical practice.
2
 Such academic interest exists alongside growing popular 
interest in women’s professional success more generally, evidenced for example by 
the popularity of Sandberg’s (2013) and other self-help style products for the 
aspirational career woman. Much of this work implicitly assumes the tension between 
feminism and professional competition has been resolved, suggesting that some form 
of compatibilism - that, in some sense, good feminists can compete in the professions 
– has become the received view.3  In so assuming, this otherwise important work both 
misses the opportunity for more fundamental critiques and risks validating or 
reinforcing structures and practices that are seriously at odds with feminism.  
In this paper, I aim to rekindle interest in the tensions between feminism and 
competition. Specifically, I argue that despite several attempts to reconcile feminism 
and competition in the professions, tension stubbornly remains. After expanding on 
the key concepts of feminism and competition that produce the relevant tensions and 
frame the subsequent analysis, I then discuss three attempts to address these conflicts, 
two which try to separate the undesirable elements of competition from the positive 
by way of relevant distinctions, while the third amounts to a pragmatic argument 
based on the value of women’s participation in the professions. All three, I argue, fail: 
the former pair’s distinctions fail to alleviate worries about competition, particularly 
in the context of the professions, while the latter pragmatic argument, though 
possessing some merit, significantly overestimates the amount of competition 
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acceptable for feminist participation. I end with some cautionary remarks regarding 
the pervasiveness of competition in contemporary life and the serious problem this 
poses for the possibility of genuine political change. 
 
 
‘Feminism’ and ‘Competition’ 
To begin, I should first clarify two essential terms of this paper, ‘competition’ and 
‘feminism’. Regarding the latter, I follow bell hooks’ definition of feminism as: “a 
movement to end sexist oppression” (1984, 31), as well as her insistence that any such 
movement must recognize the distinct but intersecting modes of oppression that 
women of varying classes, races, ethnicities, sexualities, ages, and abilities experience. 
Feminism, then, is concerned with the mechanisms and structures of oppression and 
domination, understood broadly and as operating across multiple dimensions. As 
Bordo notes, this should not mean that every feminist theorist must attend to all 
dimensions of oppression at all times (such a demand is unfeasible and unhelpful), but 
rather, should endorse a pluralist view of feminism that is cognizant of its members’ 
limited perspectives (1993, 220-229). hooks’ definition allows for this pluralism, and 
can welcome the insights from different historical threads of this movement that have 
revealed various mechanisms of oppression, including for example, Marxist, Socialist, 
Radical, and Anti-racist feminisms. It is not all-encompassing however: as hooks is 
keen to point out, ‘feminism’ is not synonymous with ‘anything goes’ (1984, 23). 
Specifically, she rejects the pursuit of equal social status between men and women, an 
aim she attributes to Liberal (bourgeois) feminism and its focus on equal 
representation. As hooks explains, the pursuit of social equality reflects a simplistic 
understanding of oppression and privileges the perspectives and interests of middle 
and upper-class white women. It seeks to redistribute the benefits of oppression rather 
than dismantle its supportive mechanisms and attitudes.  
With that said, it may seem that the conclusion of this paper is determined at 
the outset, for if feminism is defined in opposition to the aim of social equality, then it 
will naturally conflict with pursuing social equality in the professions via competition. 
As Woolf argues, the professions embody institutionalized power and privilege, and 
their value and prestige is fundamentally tied to exclusion, scarcity, and elitism. 
Achieving equal representation with men in such institutions may merely equally 
implicate women in the perpetuation of domination. 
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Such a dismissal is too quick. Contemporary debates are motivated by a more 
nuanced version of the social equality aim: instead of equal representation being the 
end in itself, greater representation of women in prestigious and privileged positions 
is viewed as a means to achieving more fundamental change. The professions need 
not remain strongholds of privilege and domination, they can be made more open, 
more egalitarian, and less exclusionary with the help of feminist insights. Further, the 
reforms necessary for, and resulting from, greater female representation in the 
professions may contribute to greater, revolutionary social change. And while it is far 
from clear that the simple presence of more women in positions of power would be 
sufficient to effect change in support of feminist policies,
 
it seems plausible to suggest 
that it is a necessary condition, allowing feminists to advocate participation in the 
professions strategically, as a way to change things from within.
4
 So, while the topic 
of competition in the professions shares its focus with the problematic Liberal aim of 
social equality, the call for greater female representation can be framed in terms of the 
more nuanced view, and cannot be rejected simply on the basis of our definition of 
feminism. The question of whether feminism (so construed) is compatible with 
competition in pursuit of professional positions remains open. 
Regarding the other essential term, there are many activities that might easily 
fall under the term ‘competition’, including for example, a friendly game of tennis, a 
professional boxing match, a Miss America pageant, a court case, a philosophical 
debate, an election, and a war. And while there may be some common features 
amongst these activities that suggest a shared definition of competition, such a general 
description will likely be somewhat misleading and unfit for the purpose of this 
analysis which is to examine problematic connections between competition and sexist 
oppression. There are significant differences in the structure of advantage and the 
regulation of privilege associated with some competitions and not others ‒ a 
difference that is lost when considering competition in the abstract. Running in a foot 
race is different than running for President of the USA, and an analysis that aims to 
encompass both will be ill-equipped to tell us about the role of competition in 
oppression and domination.  
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So, while recognizing the ideological function that competition likely has in 
many of the above activities, here I restrict my analysis to a certain spheres of activity 
where competition occurs. Specifically, to the sphere that Woolf (1938) refers to as 
“the professions”. The professions, for Woolf, refer to regulated, prestigious, and 
privileged forms of employment, including the military, civil service, law, 
government, the church, and academia, as well as the various institutions of formal 
education required for their entry.
5
 Integral to these institutions are the entrenched 
values of rank and status, the significant advantages that accompany their positions, 
and their close connection with the social, political, and economic powers associated 
with contemporary modes of oppression.
6
  
 Even in this restricted sphere however, offering a definition of competition 
remains problematic. This is partly because the essential features of competition are 
precisely what is at issue in this debate, so it’s impossible to give a definition that 
would not somewhat settle the matter in advance. But it is also because competition in 
the professions can refer to a variety of things that do not ‘reduce’ to a singular 
definition. It can, for example, mean a type of activity in which participants produce 
and submit work or abilities for comparative evaluation and recognition. It can also 
include a condition, or a state of competition, alluding to socialist feminist concerns 
regarding the capitalist production of scarcity and mechanisms that undermine 
cooperation. Finally, it can refer to an attitude or character: a way of interacting with 
others or perceiving others that is guided by a concern for acquiring or demonstrating 
superiority and power. All three forms of competition are present in the professions, 
often in integrated and mutually reinforcing ways, and together mark the subject of 
this analysis. 
While there are numerous critiques one can make of competition, feminist 
concern has primarily been with the types of character traits deemed necessary for 
competitive success. These are the qualities and desires that drive one to beat one’s 
opponent, to win the argument, to be the top of the class – in other words, to succeed 
                                                 
5
 In her analysis of barriers to women’s advancement, Valian considers similar fields, including 
business, medicine, and law (including the judiciary) noting the shared general requirements of a 
college education and a professional degree, acquired via significant investments of “time, money, and 
energy” (1999, 187). She applies similar analyses to women in academia. 
6
 This focus may appear at first glance to be worryingly elitist, that is, narrowly concerned with issues 
of interest only to already very privileged (white) women. It is, however, narrowly focused for the right 
reasons ‒ it is precisely because of the connection between the professions and privilege that the 
professions are here under scrutiny. 
 
 6 
 
in the competitive professions. Such traits include, for example, aggression, ambition, 
self-interest, combativeness, assertiveness, forcefulness, and self-assuredness. From a 
feminist perspective, there are two problems with these traits. First, one may suspect 
that given their historical association with maleness
7
, in contrast to many of the 
traditionally ‘female’ qualities of selflessness, modesty, deference, and dependence, 
success for women essentially requires cultivation of masculine traits and avoidance 
of feminine, non-competitive traits.
8
 In other words, competitive success requires that 
women become more like men. And while there is disagreement on the extent to 
which female gender norms can and should be changed, most would be wary of a 
prescription for success that required such one-sided adoption of ‘male’ qualities.  
The second problem concerns the nature of the competitive qualities 
themselves, outside of their gendered association. One predominant complaint is that 
these qualities and behaviors are historically and structurally linked to war and 
domination, and that valuing them, even in the context of the professions, contributes 
to and is constitutive of the glorification of war, hierarchy, and domination. Davion 
(1987), for example, attributes this complaint to Woolf (1938) and Yudkin (1982) in 
their criticisms of competition in the professions, and to Ruddick more generally. And 
there are clear similarities in the language and metaphors used to describe war and 
other competitive activities: Rooney, in her (2010) analysis of the adversarial method 
of argumentation in philosophy, discusses the ‘argument-as-war’ metaphor, noting the 
war-like language employed, including terms such as ‘opponents, adopting or 
defending positions, scoring points, winning or losing arguments’ (211).9 A related 
criticism places the virtues of competition in opposition to those of cooperation, 
nurturing, anti-hierarchical collectivity, and communal support, where the former 
ground problematic relations of domination and hierarchy and the latter are necessary 
to avoid and overcome such oppressive relations.
10
 Competing in the professions then, 
may promote the development of traits and behavioral norms that constitute 
domination and contribute to war, and therefore, conflict with the feminist rejection of 
domination. These initial problems with competition do not however, mark it as 
                                                 
7
 See Moulton (1983, 149). 
8
 While not exhaustive or universal, (i.e. they do not capture the variability of normative conditions 
experienced by all women across race, class, or sexuality differences), it is fair to describe these traits 
as associated with ‘the feminine’. 
9
 See also Ayim 1991 and Cohen 1995. 
10
 This type of criticism is characterized by Longino as the “radical and socialist rejection of 
competition” (1987, 256). 
 7 
 
immediately incompatible with feminism. As I go on to discuss, one strategy aimed at 
reconciling feminism and competition attempts to show that the worrisome attitudes 
and motivations currently associated with competition are only contingent features 
and can (and even should) be trimmed without rejecting competition itself. Whether 
these contrary elements of competition can in fact be trimmed is the key question of 
the next two sections of this paper.  
In what follows, I consider two attempts to achieve this reconciliation. First, I 
examine compatibilist strategies to dissolve the tension by way of separating the 
valuable elements of competition from the undesirable ones via the introduction of 
two distinctions: the competitiveness/competition and the challenge/scarcity 
distinctions. I then consider the pragmatic argument that, while not strictly compatible, 
feminists must compromise their opposition to competition in light of the greater 
benefits of participation in the professions. I begin with a discussion of the first 
compatibilist proposal: distinguishing between competitiveness and competition. 
 
 
Competitiveness/Competition Distinction 
In her (1987) critique of Woolf and Yudkin, Davion argues that we can separate the 
problematic psychology of competitiveness from the activity of competition. She asks 
us to consider a friendly game of tennis, and notes that it is possible to play the game, 
that is, engage in the activity of competition, in a supportive and even cooperative 
manner. From this, she concludes that competitors need not exhibit the emotions of 
jealousy, greed and selfishness that Woolf and others link to war, but competitors can, 
and to some degree even need, to cooperate with each other in order to compete (in 
the sense that they need to be playing in accordance with roughly the same rules). 
And while it may be difficult for certain individuals to avoid feelings of 
competitiveness when competing, that the two are not necessarily linked provides 
space for reconciling feminism and competition.  
 Davion’s specific aim is to show how competition differs from (or does not 
necessarily promote) war, though her distinction between competition and 
competitiveness has proved popular in wider discussions of competition and feminism. 
In particular, it makes an appearance in some feminist critiques of philosophical 
debate, often considered a competitive activity. Beebee for example, calls for a 
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distinction between the ‘style’ and ‘content’ of debate or discussion:11 the hostile, 
combative, or aggressive style of a philosophical debate can be separated from the 
necessarily opposing or conflicting positions or points under discussion that form the 
content.  
 Distinguishing between competitiveness and competition resolves the 
incompatibility in two ways. First, by bracketing off the traditionally male emotions 
and behaviors of jealousy, greed, combativeness, aggression, and selfishness from the 
activity of competition, we avoid the complaint that competition requires women to 
become more like men. Second, the distinction allows compatibilists to avoid the 
worry that competition is a form of, or promotes, domination, as the behaviors and 
attitudes associated with domination are only contingently linked to competition. 
Furthermore, as Beebee suggests, we not only lose nothing by dispensing with 
competitiveness, we may in fact improve the practices that are currently characterized 
by it. We improve our chances, for example, of the ‘truly’ best philosophical 
argument ‘winning’ when we prohibit combative styles of argumentation that may 
draw support for a point for the wrong reasons. It looks, then, as if feminists may be 
able to rescue the potential benefits of competition while avoiding its problems, 
leading us towards a compatibilist position. 
For all this, the distinction fails to completely dissolve the tension. For while 
we may be able to adjust our attitudes and behaviors during competition to avoid 
competitiveness, the negative emotions of competition, e.g., jealousy, greed, 
possessiveness, hostility, etc., do not just emerge during the activity of competition. 
Instead, as Woolf points out, they are more frequently the products of the outcome of 
competition. Specifically, such emotions spring from the earning of titles, degrees, 
letters, and ribbons, which are the ends of competition within the professions. Those 
who have ‘won’ become possessive of their prizes, greedy, fearful of others, and 
exclusionary. This is because these titles, letters, degrees, and other marks of ‘merit’ 
are not simple decorations, nor descriptions of skill level. Instead, they reflect facts of 
privilege and power. Woolf’s evidence for this is empirical: she recalls, for example, 
the struggle female students at Cambridge had to acquire the right to place ‘BA’ after 
their names, a title associated with some prestige and privileges (particularly as 
regards employment advantages). In protest, male members of the university marched 
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on the streets of Cambridge, shaking angry fists, shouting and vandalizing the gates of 
the women’s college.12 Woolf suggests other professions have evidence of similar 
possessive battles, and concludes:  
 
…the professions have a certain undeniable effect upon the professors. They make 
the people who practise them possessive, jealous of any infringement of their rights, 
and highly combative if anyone dares dispute them.” She asks, “[a]re we not right 
then in thinking that if we enter the same professions we shall acquire the same 
qualities? And do not such qualities lead to war? In another century or so if we 
practise the professions in the same way, shall we not be just as possessive, just as 
jealous, just as pugnacious, […]as these gentlemen are now? (1938, 831) 
 
The upshot is that the problematic emotions tied to competition are not limited to 
those associated with the process of competing, namely competitiveness. The problem 
lies not only in how people behave as they compete but also in how they feel once 
they’ve won. If human beings then, are such that possessing power and privilege 
makes one possessive of that privilege, then the tension is not dissolved by requiring 
that such privilege and power is acquired in the right way (i.e. without 
competitiveness). Perhaps these feelings are less powerful or pernicious in Davion’s 
friendly tennis match, since little is earned by ‘winning’, however, when competing in 
the professions, what we are competing for is power, and, as Woolf argues, when we 
acquire power, we become possessive and jealous of it, meaning that the problematic, 
war-like attitudes stubbornly reappear.
13
  
One final point to motivate this objection is that the effort, sacrifice, and costs 
that competition in the professions demands helps to strengthen and legitimize these 
possessive, selfish and aggressive attitudes. Many individuals enjoying success today 
in the professions were not simply handed their titles, degrees, or letters (as in the 
past), but had to work hard, sacrifice much, and train for years to achieve their 
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positions. Many spend significant amounts of their lives studying, training, saving for 
tuition fees, etc. as part of decade-long competition for success in the professions.
14
 In 
the face of such costs, the potential for aggression, possessiveness, and hostility 
towards those who might threaten to take or undermine one’s privilege is clearly high. 
 In sum, the competitiveness/competition distinction fails to block the 
problematic attitudes of hostility, aggression, possessiveness, etc., and therefore fails 
as a route to reconcile feminism and competition. The remaining compatibilist 
strategy, and the subject of the following discussion, is the suggested distinction 
between ‘challenge’ and ‘scarcity’ models of competition. 
 
 
Challenge/Scarcity Distinction 
In her analysis of competition, Longino suggests that some competitions can work to 
motivate the participants, claiming that “[t]he more well matched they are, the more 
challenged and stimulated to run her best each entrant will be” (1987, 249). She is 
particularly keen to rescue these motivational benefits of ‘competitive challenge’ from 
what she regards as legitimate feminist concerns about competition’s connection to 
domination and hierarchy. In her attempt to isolate these issues, Longino introduces a 
distinction between the challenge and the scarcity models of competition. 
Longino’s exemplar of a challenge-model competition is a footrace, where the 
outcome is determined by the differential abilities of the competitors; here, 
“[i]inequalities (differences, however momentary and transitory) in the relevant 
qualities of the competitors make for winners or losers” (1987, 249). Meanwhile, 
scarcity-model competitions are ‘zero-sum’ games where “limitations on the 
availability of the object sought make for winners and losers” (249), where this 
limitation is a product of the game’s rules. Consequently, paradigmatic examples 
include baseball or tennis - games in which ties are structurally impossible, as 
competitors continue to play until there is a definite winner.  
Using this distinction, Longino aims to clarify the grounds of disagreement 
between what she calls the radical feminist critique of competition, and the liberal 
feminist support for competition. To her mind, the liberal feminist support for 
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competition overemphasizes the challenge-model of competition, unduly overlooking 
the problematic conditions of scarcity that work to regulate and protect positions of 
power and privilege. Conversely, radical feminists wrongly conceptualize all 
competition in terms of the scarcity-model, leading them to misunderstand all 
competition as a desire for domination, motivated via artificial conditions of scarcity 
necessary to maintain capitalism. The implication is that there may be room for 
competition within feminism, though it will depend on it being the right sort. For 
Longino, this space can be found by trying to disassociate the motivational benefits of 
competition from the negative scarcity-model. Presumably, we could avoid the 
legitimate feminist worries regarding artificial scarcity, hierarchy, and domination by 
participating only in genuine challenge-model competitions, thereby finding a route 
towards compatibilism.
15
  
While the desire to be the best, or to out-do one’s opponent, desires linked to 
the scarcity-model, may also be motivational for some, Longino implies that we need 
not aim to beat our opponents in order to want to do our best. While the scarcity-
model explicitly requires one to outdo one’s competitors, the challenge-model merely 
lets this happen – it’s not built into the model. Our desires therefore, need not 
necessarily be hierarchical or domineering, desires that conflict with feminism, rather 
we can simply rise to the challenge of the activity.
16
 Furthermore, while genuine 
hierarchies are explicitly enforced on the scarcity-model, any such ordering is 
accidental on the challenge-model. Thus challenge-model competitions appear to 
avoid the facts of domination and hierarchy, as well as the problematic desires for 
domination and the associated attitudes of aggression, possessiveness, and ambition 
that conflict with feminism.  
One question however, is whether we can separate the motivational element in 
a challenge-style competition from the problematic desire to dominate or outdo one’s 
competitors associated with the scarcity model. If we cannot, we have not resolved 
the tension. Additionally, if such a separation is possible, then it may be too 
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successful, allowing the motivation to do one’s best to be separated entirely from the 
challenge model as well, leaving no connection to the process of competition, and 
hence no motivation for compatibilism. 
 We can quickly note that we can separate the positive motivational element 
from competition, since performing a non-competitive activity with other people who 
are comparatively skilled or talented can motivate one to do one’s best (though it need 
not necessarily do so). For example, I could join a group dancing lesson where my 
fellow dance students and I can be motivated by performing together, without this 
being a competition, since, according to Longino, “competition always involves a 
contest among individuals seeking the same thing when not all can obtain it” (250), 
and my dancing lessons lack this dimension. Competition does not seem necessary 
then, to motivate one to do one’s best, undermining our reasons for pursuing a 
reconciliation project. However, we may pursue the current question regardless; if we 
can participate in challenge-model competitions and benefit from the positive 
motivational element (without the negative features of scarcity), then we can perhaps 
identify a kind of competition safe for feminists to pursue and even advocate. We 
must ask then, how might a challenge-model competition motivate a participant to do 
her best, and how might it do this in a way that differs from the non-competitive 
dance class from above, as well as from the dominating desires to outdo others 
associated with the scarcity model? Given Longino’s understanding of what 
competition involves, what is it that the challenge-model competitors seek that all 
cannot obtain, where the reason they cannot all obtain it is not a condition of enforced 
scarcity? 
 Consider the simple footrace example that Longino uses to illustrate the 
challenge model. One possibility is that all participants are seeking to run their own 
personal best, this however does not satisfy our criteria, as all could (potentially) 
succeed in achieving this aim. A second possibility is that they are all seeking to run 
the ‘fastest’, whether or not this distinction comes with other material perks or 
rewards. This however, also falls foul of our criteria, as scarcity is built into the 
meaning of the label ‘fastest’. To be the fastest is to have out-run, i.e. out-done, one’s 
competitors, and we cannot escape the dominating nature of this label by re-
describing the motivation. Perhaps this is a failure of imagination on my part, but I 
see little difference between wanting to win so that others lose, and wanting to win in 
a way that entails that others lose.  
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 A further possibility is that participants all seek to run the ‘fastest’, where 
‘fastest’ is a label that can be shared. As Longino stresses when making the 
challenge/scarcity distinction, the virtue of the challenge model is that it doesn’t 
enforce the result of single winners – in principle, all runners could cross the finish 
line at the same time. However, if it was genuinely possible for all, or even only most, 
of the runners to do equally well, then ‘fastest’ loses its meaning and we again lose 
any understanding of how this could provide motivation. If it is not genuinely possible, 
perhaps because of the natural differences in our abilities, then we are again faced 
with a situation in which competitors are all seeking a title that has value in virtue of 
its scarcity, though this scarcity is not built explicitly into the structure of the 
competition (as in scarcity model), but is only a consequence of our differences and 
the competition’s ability to differentiate us accordingly. 
 My sense here is that Longino’s challenge model merely shifts the problems 
with the scarcity-model, rather than resolving them. In challenge-model competitions, 
the scarcity is no longer explicitly enforced, but rather the result of differences 
between people. However, this offloading fails to avoid the domination concerns 
linked with the scarcity model. While the competitors need not have the direct desire 
to outdo or beat one another, they must instead aim to be the fastest, the brightest, the 
best, where this implies having outdone others. We may have avoided the obvious 
connection with domination by making this move – our competitors no longer need to 
actively desire to literally dominate the others – however, the facts of hierarchy, 
domination, and the emphasizing of superiority over others, remain. If we consider 
how such competitions work in the professions, titles, awards, and labels of 
achievement are valuable in virtue of the power, the very real advantages they confer. 
The emphasis being on advantage – these are titles, awards, etc. that are valuable 
because (relatively) few others have them. Not only does this look a lot like 
domination to me, it returns us to the concerns raised regarding the link discussed in 
the previous section between attaining privilege and feelings of greed, selfishness, 
possessiveness, and aggression.  
I fail to see how challenge-style competitions can provide unique reasons for 
motivation that are relevantly different from motivation on the scarcity model. 
Without the titles, distinctions, and labels (and in the case of the professions, the 
power and privilege that come along with them), challenge-style competitions cease 
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to be competitions, and become ordinary activities. With these titles, they cannot 
escape the charge of domination.  
The emphasis in this and the preceding section was on the connection between 
competition, including the winning of titles, degrees, power, and privilege, and 
attitudes of possessiveness, selfishness, and ultimately, of domination. Admittedly, 
there is no necessary relation between winning a competition and these problematic 
qualities. It is possible for an individual to be motivated to achieve her own personal 
goals and to remain a ‘humble’ winner – to refrain from emphasizing superiority and 
exercising her acquired privilege.
17
 However, notice that to avoid the problems 
outlined above, the individual must not think of the competition as a competition, but 
rather as an ordinary, i.e. non-comparative activity. She cannot think of herself or her 
abilities as better than her competitors’, nor that she is deserving of the awarded 
privilege. She must, in effect, refrain from competing. So, rather than offering a case 
where feminism and competition are compatible, the ‘humble winner’ is instead 
someone who engaged in an activity alongside others in competition, but did not 
herself compete. Such conduct is possible, though does not immediately dissolve all 
of our worries concerning competition and privilege. There remain problems, for 
example, with the legitimating power of participating in competition (even if one is 
not really competing), as well as the difficulty in pulling apart having and exercising 
privilege. However, the key question in such cases is, if the results truly mean nothing, 
why enter the competition? One answer, considered in the following section, is that 
feminists cannot afford not to. 
 
 
Competition as a ‘Necessary Evil’ 
A third, pragmatic route to address the tension, hinted at by Longino, Martin, Beebee, 
and others, is to argue that the benefits of participating in the professions sufficiently 
outweigh any concerns regarding participation in their competitions. We may not be 
able to rid competition of its inherent tension with feminism, but the benefits of 
participating in the professions are too great to ignore – or conversely, the costs of not 
participating are too high. Adopting a (pseudo)compatibilist view is more of an offer 
that feminists cannot refuse than a happy reconciliation.  
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 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
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There are two ways to conceive of this approach. One is to view women’s 
professional success itself as the valued end, part of an overarching and non-
forfeitable aim of achieving equal representation in prestigious and powerful positions. 
This conception however, cannot legitimate (even) a pseudo-compatibilism, given its 
conflict with the definition of feminism advanced at the start, and can therefore be put 
to one side. Another way to conceive of this approach that does not run afoul of our 
definition of feminism, is to view professional success as a means to a valuable end, 
that is, as a means to ending sexist oppression. The power and influence that comes 
with professional success provides the means, it is thought, to effect change. This 
might be to change policy relating to issues external to the profession, or it could be to 
change the profession itself. This approach, in academic philosophy, is reflected in the 
call for greater numbers of female professors, which, it is thought, will be both the 
impetus for and consequence of, eliminating sexist oppression from the profession. 
Moreover, reforming academia will have beneficial, knock-on effects for feminism 
more generally, as the disempowered gain a voice and the dominant class loses its 
grip on the production of knowledge. In short, to those who worry about the 
connection between the professions and privilege and oppression, proponents of this 
view “can retort that by entering the public world they will change it” (Longino 1987, 
255).  While this view more astutely reflects the motivations underlying recent calls to 
increase female representation, there are three substantial issues to raise that 
undermine, or at least significantly limit, its potential to justify competition in the 
professions. All three point to the effects competition has on undermining or 
restricting the potential for change, either within the professions or in the general 
political sphere. 
The first problem is the difficulty in changing the professions while in the 
process of competing for a position. Here, sporting analogies may be useful. It is clear 
that if you want to play professional tennis, you have to play by the rules. The rules 
govern what counts as a point, what counts as a foul or penalty, and what can get you 
thrown out of the game. Norms of practice govern (though less formally) the kinds of 
movements you should make, the tools you might use, your training regime, etc. 
There is little, if any, room for novel styles of play. The top professional tennis 
players have acquired their status as a consequence of following highly restrictive and 
precise norms of ‘good play’. Similarly, competition in the professions works in the 
same way, to motivate (or discipline) acting in specific ways in accordance with 
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accepted norms.
18
 Of course, the rules and norms of behavior in the professions are 
not as formalized as professional tennis, though it would be false to say there are no 
such rules or norms (or that they aren’t formalized at all). Furthermore, these rules 
and norms are defined in ways that protect the established institutions and professions 
rather than allow much in the way of challenge.  
Dotson, for example, expresses frustration with how norms governing what 
counts as ‘philosophy’ work to restrict avenues of inquiry, privileging debates and 
questions that are already established, and consequently prevent transformation of the 
profession. In her experience, alternative conceptions that diverge from the dominant 
view of philosophy ‘as critique’, are not welcomed as innovative styles of play, but 
are challenged. She is frequently asked but ”[h]ow is your project philosophy?” (2011, 
406) to which in response, she finds herself modifying and repackaging her work such 
that can ‘pass’ according to prevailing norms. 19  But such ‘passing’ leaves the 
dominant norms intact. It is clearly difficult then, if not impossible, to undermine or 
subvert the norms while you participate in them, which you need to do in order to 
compete. Feminists must pin their hopes then on being able to effect change after 
having achieved a position, for it is very difficult, if not impossible, to change them in 
the process of competition.  
The second problem relates to the effects of competition on the successful 
competitors, effects that hamper their subsequent ability to change the professions. 
There are two such effects to discuss. First is the selecting and transforming function 
of the competition itself. In her analysis of the assimilation of women into the 
academy, Martin notes that academia has so far been very successful in co-opting and 
restricting feminist scholarship, incorporating women in a uni-directional pattern of 
change, suggesting we lose our anti-establishment aims and ideas as we join and are 
selected by, the establishment. She suggests further that the process of assimilating, 
that is, learning to write in the accepted language, to think about the acceptable topics, 
etc. is not a superficial act, but a somewhat irreversible change in the assimilated, 
leaving the newly minted academic without the valuable, outsider perspective that 
offered the tools for change. Berruz recounts her own experience, as a Latina in 
philosophy, of the pressure to assimilate, but also of what she calls the ‘wounding’ 
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 For a related discussion of the disciplining effects of professional philosophy, see Jenkins 2013. 
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 Berruz offers a similar description of the need to abide by philosophy’s prescriptive norms, which 
she also describes as ‘passing’ (2014, 184). 
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effects of ‘duplicity’ – a protective strategy to resist assimilation via a shift between 
two selves. She warns that “[d]uplicity assumes a return or shift back to a genuine self 
that existed before the duplicitous act, but the truth remains that there is no original 
self to return to” (2014, 183). As many have already testified, the assimilationist force 
of trying to ‘pass’, i.e. to compete, in the professions is very real, and its stifling effect 
on revolutionary potential needs to be taken seriously.  
The second effect is the role of competition in giving the ‘winner’ a reason for 
perpetuating the exclusionary practices of the professions. In his discussion of 
competition and co-operation (from the economic perspective), Coleman notes that 
co-operation is in fact the better strategy for the capitalist than competition. A group 
of producers can co-operate to fix prices so that the maximum can be extracted from 
the consumer. Furthermore, one way to protect a co-operation scheme is to require a 
large entry fee into the club, thus ensuring that new entrants have a stake in 
perpetuating the scheme. This rings familiar, particularly when we remember that 
academia, the church, politics, etc. were once described as ‘old boys clubs’, 
‘brotherhoods’ – they are in fact better characterized by co-operation rather than 
competition, at least once you’re in. The high entry fee though also rings familiar, as 
well as Coleman’s description of how it functions to ensure new entrants have a stake 
in enforcing the exclusivity (else her ‘investment’ is lost). It is precisely the high cost 
of competing to acquire positions in the professions that helps to undermine one’s 
desire to make them more open and less privileged. 
 This of course doesn’t mean it is impossible for an individual who has paid 
that dear entry fee to then reject the advantages of ‘brotherhood’, only that it is 
unlikely and quite difficult. Just how difficult, is in my view, vastly underestimated 
and misunderstood by many feminists. 
 The third problem is the impact that competition has on undermining the 
potential for the professions to effect wider political change . This is a similar though 
more complex issue to that discussed as part of the first problem, and to help detail 
the concern, I turn again to Woolf’s rich critique of the professions. Central to 
Woolf’s view is the firm belief that political change requires truth, by which she 
means individuals having the time, resources, and the freedom (from fear) to say, 
write, and create what they think, want, and will. Without this freedom, whatever is 
said, written, or created cannot be new, but must say what it is told to say, write what 
it is directed to write, and create what it is expected to create. Woolf recognized that 
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entry into the professions represented a path to some of this necessary freedom for 
women, ending their total financial dependence on men and providing the means to 
‘earn enough to live on’. She is keenly aware however, of the ways in which our 
participation can constrict this all important freedom and honesty and again become a 
resource for the dominant view. She describes what she calls the ‘adulterating’ 
motives of money, vanity, advertisement, and publicity, the spoils of competition in 
the professions, where work that results from these motives is necessarily biased, and 
at best not ‘the whole truth’, having been influenced by the dominant powers. 
For example, Woolf cites the common practice in her time of reading three 
daily newspapers – three are needed in order to compensate for the biases each paper 
reflects. Journalists are either explicitly or implicitly required to produce articles that 
accord with the views of the owners and editors – they lack the complete freedom to 
write as they wish when writing for their editor as part of their job. In a similar vein, I 
am sure many aspiring and practicing academics are familiar with the task of writing a 
research proposal, or an article for publication, and how writing with these aims in 
mind changes how we write and what we say. In writing for example, with the 
‘publication-motive’, or the ‘funding-motive’ in mind, we adulterate our work, 
undermining its potential to function as an expression of our genuine beliefs and 
opinions. Without the space to write about what we want to write about, and in our 
own words, we lose the opportunity to express a different view, to contribute to an 
actual change in society rather than more of the same. Our entrance into the 
professions can only be understood as progress if they provide the means for that all 
important freedom. Without this, the professions fail to function as a means to change.  
Again, Woolf recognizes the opportunity for freedom that the professions 
provide, but to avoid having all of one’s work within them suffer from adulteration, 
she advises us that once we have made enough to live on, we must stop practicing (i.e. 
use our free time for whatever else we like), or continue practicing but not for money, 
publicity or reputation, only the love of the work, allowing it to function as an 
genuine expression of ourselves. This may sound simple, but could be a tall order. In 
academia, for example, this might mean refusing a promotion to Professor, when you 
are well provided for at a Lecturer salary. Or, if one has achieved a post and no longer 
needs to demonstrate a record of published work, one proceeds to publish 
anonymously, or refuses to be highlighted as the ‘keynote speaker’. These are difficult 
requests, and it is fair to ask if they need be this hard. However, I fear it is both too 
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easy to give oneself the benefit of the doubt when evaluating one’s own motives, and 
hard not to question the motives of others when considering their work. For there is 
also the worry that others can doubt the sincerity of your words and deeds when they 
are found within a context of competition or other adulterating motives, further 
undermining their potential for change.  
The pragmatic argument then, that women should accept the potential ills of 
competition given the benefits of participating in the professions, at least partially 
fails. The more nuanced feminist aim of achieving change via participation is 
rendered problematic. Participation in the professions’ competitions works to 
minimize, co-opt, and even negate the potential for genuine change. We cannot 
change things from within the competition, so we must, as much as possible, remain 
outside that game.
20
 So, while we find we must participate in the professions and their 
associated competitions to some degree, we must aim to limit our competition to the 
absolute minimum, a minimum that conflicts with contemporary calls for women to 
acquire greater positions of power and privilege. 
 
 
Competition in the ‘Game of Life’  
This leads me to my final point, which is to suggest that our modern situation should 
give us particular cause for concern. In her One Dimensional Woman, Power offers an 
analysis of modern work, and challenges the claim that employment has proven 
emancipatory for women. In particular, she notes the increased precariousness of 
work, and the associated need to market more of your self to employers. Employers 
now look not only at professional skills and qualifications, but the character traits of 
professionalism. This includes evaluating volunteer work, athletics, drama, and 
committee work. These activities are then pursued for the purpose of building one’s 
CV and are experienced as networking or professional development opportunities. 
Consider the following advice taken from the Cambridge Careers Guide pamphlet 
aimed at helping students with job seeking: 
 
At Cambridge, it’s easy to get involved in more of what you enjoy – from sports, 
music, committees to volunteering – and employers value this too … Taking a 
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 Woolf (1938) writes of the value of women’s outsider perspective, even proposing a Society of 
Outsiders as women’s only possible avenue for political change. 
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position of responsibility in a club, society or committee can be a great way to 
demonstrate teamwork, leadership, people skills, commercial awareness… (2014, 8) 
 
This development should give cause for serious concern. As I argued in the previous 
section, it was only actions performed outside of the professions and their 
competitions that had the potential for revolutionary effect. If the activities that were 
once ignored by the professions thereby providing that space, the room for self-
development and expression, are no longer outside the scope of the corrupting 
motives of the professions, we have clearly lost ground rather than gained. I would 
end with a speculative and perhaps alarmist comment that this demand to make ever 
more of our selves subjects of the market is perhaps the one of most worrying issues 
facing feminists today. Rather than focusing on the persistent underrepresentation of 
women in top positions within the professions, or on how little we have gained, we 
should perhaps be alarmed at what we are losing, and at what the ever increasing 
reach of competition means for our potential to effect change. 
To clarify, I am not suggesting that women should abandon the professions 
and refrain from pursuing satisfying careers. As Woolf resignedly observes, women 
must earn enough to live on, and the professions do offer a potentially fulfilling 
means for achieving this. I have argued however, following Woolf, that this leaves 
women between a rock and a hard place. Existing attempts to excise the negative 
elements of competition in the professions amount to superficial and ineffective 
reforms. Furthermore, the hope that participation in the professions’ competitions 
would enable those participants to advance feminist aims has been similarly 
undermined. We are left squarely facing that stubborn rock and unyielding hard place. 
That said, I do not want to characterize our options as all-or-nothing choices, i.e. 
either we give up on the professions or we devote ourselves to acquiring as much 
privilege and power as possible. For many of us, some degree of participation is 
simply the only way open to us. There is a difference however, between resigning 
ourselves to participation and considering the tension therefore reconciled, and 
advocating a ‘middle-way’ (i.e. limited participation) that recognizes the 
unresolvability of the situation and demands that we continually re-evaluate just how 
much participation is necessary. Importantly, this re-evaluation should happen at the 
personal level ‒ there is not a one-size-fits-all degree of participation that can be 
universally prescribed. Everyone’s situation is different, and it is not for me, or 
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anyone else, to condone or condemn an individual’s professional success. In 
particular, I do not mean to imply that those without titles, degrees, or professorships 
should criticize those who have them (nor, for that matter, the other way around). 
Moreover, I would stress that identifying the concrete ways in which we can practice 
the professions outside their competitions, and thereby avoid hegemonic appropriation, 
is no easy task. Again, I am keen to avoid general prescriptions, especially given that 
individuals’ motives for the same act can differ. But I also do not mean to leave each 
of us on our own ‒ we certainly can, and should, think about this problem together 
and learn from others’ reflections, experiments and experiences. 
The demand however, is to take seriously the intractable dilemma that each of 
us faces, and for each of us to decide the direction we will take. It is also, to think 
more carefully about calls to see more women in high-ranking positions. In particular, 
we must consider how focusing on this aim diverts our attention and our resources 
from creating alternative spaces in which unadulterated work can exist. We must 
accept, though, that we cannot escape our rock and hard-place without some bruising. 
In my view, it is our desires for prestige, power, privilege, and domination that should 
take the bruising, which requires sacrificing certain levels of success, wealth, and 
recognition. But, as I have tried to show, for those who claim to reject privilege and 
domination, such sacrifices are no great loss, as they, in fact, mark the way to 
liberation. 
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